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Abstract 
We study rights offerings using a sample of 8,238 rights offers announced during 1995-2008 in 
69 countries. Although shareholders prefer having the option to trade rights, issuers deliberately 
restrict tradability in 38% of the offerings. We argue that firms restrict rights trading to avoid the 
execution risk associated with strict prospectus requirements, a prolonged and uncertain 
transaction process, and the potentially negative information signaled via the price of traded 
rights. In line with this argument, we find that issuers restricting tradability are those with more 
to lose from reduced participation or that are more likely to face execution risk. 
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In a rights offering, issuers give existing shareholders the right to buy new shares at a specified 
price. Because they allow current shareholders to avoid dilution, rights offerings are favorably 
regarded by regulators outside the United States and are mandatory in many European and Latin 
American countries (Spamann 2010). In the context of growing international equity issuance, 
rights offerings have become increasingly important (Figure 1). In 2007, firms around the world 
raised $175 billion through rights offerings, compared with $346 billion through cash offerings 
and $295 billion by going public. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
However, rights offerings do not automatically protect existing shareholders from 
dilution. When current shareholders cannot sell their rights, it is costly not to subscribe. And even 
when rights are traded, the market for them is illiquid and they are often underpriced. More 
specifically, within a sample of rights issues around the world announced during the period 1995-
2008, we find that the average right does not trade during 55% of the trading days, as compared 
with 20% for the underlying stock. In 17% of the trading days, the rights are so undervalued 
relative to the stock that the quoted price violates the lower put-call parity (PCP) arbitrage bound.  
In many countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, 
issuers are even allowed to restrict the tradability of the rights. In our sample, only 84% of 
offerings have tradable rights. In the group of countries that do not mandate the tradability of 
rights, issuers give shareholders this option in only 62% of the offerings. Yet, shareholders have a 
strong preference for tradability. In countries where issuers have the choice, cumulative abnormal 
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returns in the three-day window around the announcement of rights offerings are, on average, 2% 
higher for offerings with tradable rights.  
In this paper, we investigate why so many companies decide to restrict the tradability of 
their rights even when doing so is neither required by regulation nor desired by the shareholders. 
For this purpose, we use a comprehensive global sample of 8,238 rights issues obtained from 
Bloomberg for the 1995–2008 period. 
In a Modigliani-Miller setting, which has no transaction costs, liquidity constraints, 
information asymmetry, or control rights, tradability is irrelevant. Between the announcement 
and the ex right date, shareholders can sell shares to investors who wish to exercise the right. If 
they wish to continue holding shares, they can buy them back after the offering. When there are 
frictions, however, this picture changes. In particular, three factors are relevant to the decision to 
restrict the tradability of the rights: trading costs, stock misvaluation, and execution risk. We 
investigate each of these frictions in turn. 
First, tradability is costly. Firms must pay a market maker for trading the rights and write 
a prospectus for external shareholders. These costs could be especially burdensome to small 
firms. So if issuers make rights nontradable because of transaction costs, we should expect small 
firms to restrict tradability and obtain — thanks to the lower transaction costs — better returns at 
their announcement (Transaction cost hypothesis). And indeed, consistent with this transaction 
cost hypothesis, we find that small firms are more likely to restrict trading. However, we do not 
find that this is reflected in the market’s reaction. Offerings by small firms do not have higher 
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announcement returns when the rights are not traded, and firm size does not explain the 
difference in announcement returns between tradable and nontradable offerings.  
Second, firms may prefer to restrict tradability in the case of stock undervaluation. When 
shares are undervalued, managers concerned with maximizing the wealth of the existing 
shareholders may be reluctant to issue shares to outside investors. With a non-traded rights issue, 
only existing shareholders can subscribe and will not be diluted as long as they exercise their 
rights. When the rights are traded, however, shareholders can still sell their rights at a price that is 
too low compared to the real value and transfer wealth to the buyer of the right (Paternalistic 
hypothesis). 
This “paternalistic” motive is more likely in firms with better alignment between 
shareholders and management. This implies that tradability is more likely to be restricted in firms 
with better governance, and trading restrictions are indeed more common in countries with better 
governance. The paternalistic hypothesis also proposes that managers know that the stock is 
undervalued, so firms that restrict tradability should exhibit higher post-issuance profitability 
improvements than do firms with no restrictions on tradability. Such improvements would be 
reflected in higher excess returns whether at the announcement or over a longer period. However, 
we find no evidence to support this prediction. Firms actually become less profitable following 
nontradable rights offerings than tradable ones. Investors anticipate this effect: announcement 
returns after nontradable rights issues are significantly lower than those after tradable rights 
issues. This negative reaction does not correct in the long run, as long-run returns do not 
significantly differ between issuers of tradable and nontradable rights.  
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Finally, restrictions on tradability can reduce execution risk when the demand for new 
shares is limited and uncertain. There are three reasons why such execution risk can be reduced 
with nontradable rights. First, if rights are not tradable then shareholders’ wealth is diluted if they 
do not participate in the issue. This lends an element of coercion to the issue, as remarked by the 
chairman of an investment firm: “The company is holding a gun against your head.”1 Some 
shareholders may still choose not to participate and thus accept the dilution, in which case the 
board of directors can give “oversubscription” privileges to existing investors and/or sell non-
exercised rights to outside investors. Second, restricting tradability expedites the issuance. 
Indeed, tradability requires additional time, prolonging the average period between 
announcement and effective date from 12 days to 21 days. During this extended period, negative 
information about the firm or about market liquidity could leak and thereby reduce demand.
2
 
Third, restricting tradability reduces negative information spillovers. Indeed, shareholders may 
infer information from the trading activity in the rights market. We show that rights markets are 
usually illiquid and that rights are often undervalued relative to the stock. Such illiquid markets 
tend to be dominated by insiders (e.g., Cremers and Weinbaum 2010). As such, low rights prices 
can amplify negative signals. Therefore, restricting tradability can help to decrease the 
uncertainty about the offering (Execution risk hypothesis). 
                                                          
1
 “Rights issues: Devil lies in detail,” Financial Review, July 4, 2012. 
2
 The concern about the impact of negative information is exacerbated by the stricter prospectus requirements that 
apply to traded rights issues—namely, requirements to provide more detailed information about the planned use of 
proceeds and risks associated with the firm. Disclosing such information could have a significant negative effect, as 
when high levels of financial distress are presumed if a firm announces that issue proceeds will be used to repay 
debt. 
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Certain types of firms are especially concerned about execution risk: firms that urgently 
need the proceeds because they are in financial distress, small risky firms with thinly traded 
stocks that are more sensitive to negative information, and firms that already possess negative 
information about the future. Indeed, we find that, in line with this execution risk hypothesis, 
firms with poor recent performance, relatively illiquid stock, and a low interest coverage ratio are 
more likely to make their issue rights nontradable. These firms are also less likely to find an 
underwriter who will guarantee the proceeds.
3
 Also, in line with the intuition that execution risk 
is greater when the firm has bleak prospects, the stock market on average reacts negatively to 
offerings with nontradable rights. The firm performance (ROA) after such offerings is inferior to 
the performance subsequent to offerings with tradable rights. Uncertainty may not just be only 
about the firm, but about the market as well. Issuers are less likely to make rights tradable when 
economic conditions are bad (i.e., markets whose index falls more than 10% in the 42 days prior 
to the offering), and the abnormal announcement returns are higher in such “crisis” markets when 
rights are not tradable. 
Execution risk can be reduced in other ways, such as offering deep discounts and 
underwriting. Yet, discounts are costly to those who do not exercise or sell their rights, which is a 
substantial proportion of shareholders [34%, according to a survey of U.S.-based issuers 
conducted by Holderness and Pontiff (2012)]. Furthermore, a deep discount may signal 
management’s belief that the stock is overvalued. Such signals can increase execution risk. 
                                                          
3
 Although we have no access to consolidated underwriting information in our sample, we manually collect 
information for a random sample of rights issues with nontradable rights announced in 2013. The majority of the 
sample issuers did not employ an underwriter, and very few used standby underwriting by related parties (including 
board members). 
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Discounts also increase the number of new shares needed and thereby reduce the post-issuance 
earnings per share, a measure that determines the bonus of many executives. Underwriting are 
not available to some issuers and costly to others: both regulators and customers often complain 
about fees they think are too high with respect to the insurance they provide, which can be priced 
as a put option (Marsh 1980; Office of Fair Trading 2011).
4
 These circumstances can make 
nontradability a more attractive way to reduce execution risk.  
Many firms outside the U.S. and U.K. have controlling block owners, which have 
different incentives and information than do minority shareholders. In particular, shareholders 
with large ownership stakes need to finance the purchase of a larger number of new shares if they 
want to exercise their rights. Hence, we expect that blockholders will insist on having the option 
to sell their rights because they would suffer substantially more from not participating. In other 
words, blockholders are unlikely to consent to nontradable rights unless they plan to subscribe. 
Therefore, the decision to make rights nontradable may be interpreted as a signal of their 
commitment or of their confidence in the fact that the issue’s proceeds will be invested wisely.5 
We therefore explicitly control for blockholder stakes. However, our results show that 
blockholder commitment does not affect the firm’s decision to have rights traded, the 
announcement returns, or the firm’s subsequent returns. 
                                                          
4
 Underwriters often refuse to take on offerings and/or insist on substantial discounts as a condition for their 
mandate. According to “Guidance for Rights Issues” (Australian Government Takeovers Panel, report no. 17): “For 
many companies a related party or a major shareholder is the only realistic source of underwriting.” 
5
 Consistent with the hypothesis that blockholder participation is a good signal, Larrain and Urzua Infante (2013) 
show that the positive long-term performance of Chilean rights offers are predicted by blockholder participation. 
That being said, Baek et al. (2006) and Atanasov et al. (2010) find that blockholders in Bulgaria and South Korea use 
nontradable rights offerings to squeeze out minority shareholders. Subsequently these firms are less subject to 
takeover risk and more likely to engage in self-dealing. 
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This paper is, as far as we know, the first comprehensive international study of rights 
markets. Our documentation of the existence and liquidity of the secondary rights market 
contributes to the discussion on the costs and benefits of rights offerings. Existing research on 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is mainly country specific, which is due perhaps to the wide 
variation in regulations and incidences of rights offerings across countries. In the U.S., only a few 
companies have made rights offerings in recent decades. This “disappearing rights phenomenon” 
has been documented by Smith (1977), Hansen (1988), Eckbo and Masulis (1992), Kothare 
(1997), Armitage (1998), Heron and Lie (2004), and Ursel (2006). In an international study, 
McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2008) report a relation between country-wide governance standards 
and the choice between rights and cash offers. Holderness and Pontiff (2012) explain the lack of 
U.S. rights issues by arguing that they do not offer sufficient protection to uninformed or 
irrational shareholders. In a direct survey of issuers, these authors document that fewer than two-
thirds of shareholders sell or exercise rights. Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) find similarly low 
participation rates in Finland and also document that Finnish shareholders exercise rights too 
early or sell them below the intrinsic value. Balachandran et al. (2008, 2012) document take-up, 
liquidity, and announcement returns for nontradable rights in Australia. We provide evidence on 
both the undervaluation and tradability of rights in a larger international sample and describe how 
they are linked to the regulatory framework. 
We also document long-run returns to rights offerings around the world. Previous 
research on long-run returns after seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) is mostly country specific 
and focuses primarily on cash offers (e.g., Loughran and Ritter 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
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1995). These studies report negative long-run returns. The common interpretation is that 
companies that are concerned about the interests of current shareholders issue shares to new 
investors when shares are overvalued. International studies on long-run returns after SEOs (e.g., 
Foerster and Karolyi 1999; McLean, Pontiff, and Wantanabe 2009) do not distinguish between 
rights and cash offerings. We use a large sample to document negative long-run returns after 
rights offerings. This finding contradicts the argument that firms use rights issues (rather than 
cash offers) to avoid diluting existing shareholders when the shares are undervalued. 
Finally, we add to the literature on law and finance. La Porta et al. (1998) list the 
countries where rights issues are mandatory, a feature that has been widely used, sometimes 
(Spamann 2010) in refined form, as a measure of shareholder protection. We show that the effect 
of rights offerings on shareholder protection is more complex than previously indicated, and we 
review the impact of regulations on the existence of secondary rights markets. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we provide an overview of the institutional 
characteristics of markets for rights around the world. In Section II, we describe the data and 
provide descriptive statistics. In Section III, we describe the rights market, and in Section IV we 
test for the determinants of the choice to make rights tradable. In Section V, we examine whether 
tradability is associated with announcement returns, long-term excess returns, or long-term 
profitability. We conclude in Section VI. 
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I. Institutional Characteristics of Rights Offerings 
A. Anatomy of a rights offering 
The existence and nature of regulations on rights offerings vary widely across countries. In this 
section, we provide an overview of the rights issue process. 
The offering. In a rights offering, the issuer’s shareholders have the preemptive right to purchase 
a pro rata portion of the new shares. The subscription price is typically set at a discount to the 
recent market price to encourage participation. Some issuers (notably, U.S. and Austrian firms) 
first announce a range for the subscription price or the discount and do not actually set the price 
until after the subscription period. This procedure ensures that the stock price does not fall below 
the subscription price.
6
 The number of rights given to shareholders is based on the number of 
shares owned on a specified “record date.” That is, shareholders have a window of time during 
which to sell their shares if they prefer not to participate. The record date is, on average, five days 
after announcement of the rights issue. In only 12 of the 1,249 nontradable rights offerings in our 
sample is the record date before the announcement. 
Trading of rights. In tradable rights offerings, shareholders who choose not to exercise their 
rights can trade them in a secondary market during the offering period. Trading in the absence of 
a market is rare and costly, and it typically involves larger blocks of rights. Thus, issuers 
effectively restrict the trading of rights when they do not provide a market for them. 
                                                          
6
 Curiously, the main source of transaction risk is the number of share subscribed rather than the event that the 
market price falls below the subscription price. Some offers are fully subscribed despite a market price below the 
subscription price, and many offers are not fully subscribed despite a market price far above the subscription price, 
especially in illiquid markets. The stock price also only rarely falls below the subscription price, 21 times in our 
sample. Consistent with the execution risk hypothesis, all 21 transactions involved tradable rights. 
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Non-exercised rights. After the subscription period, the issuer can sell any rights that were not 
exercised (or sell the nonpurchased new shares directly) to a so-called standby buyer or place 
them in the public market. Standby buyers are usually controlling shareholders, related parties, or 
underwriters. Public placements typically occur in an accelerated book-building process that is 
comparable to cash offerings. Issuers can also give shareholders an “oversubscription privilege” 
that entitles subscribers to a second preemptive right to the unsubscribed shares. Very few 
regulators (notably, Hong Kong and the U.K.) require issuers to reimburse non-exercising 
shareholders from the proceeds due to purchased new shares. 
Regulations and discretion. Rights offerings, tradability, and reimbursements are regulated by 
securities laws and listing rules. By definition, preemptive rights are optional; hence, 
shareholders can waive them (subject to country-specific limitations), typically in a majority 
vote. This fact makes rights offerings susceptible to possible conflicts of interest between groups 
of shareholders. For example, issuers in most countries exclude foreign shareholders from the 
distribution and/or tradability of rights. Further variants arise as a function of differences in 
brokerage agreements. In many European countries, most brokers will sell rights even when 
shareholders give no instructions to exercise or sell. Such behavior reduces the losses of the 
investors who do not actively decide about the subscription (e.g., Holderness and Pontiff 2012). 
Prospectus. Issuers must provide a prospectus that details the offering’s characteristics and states 
its objectives and the risks involved. Exemptions to this rule typically apply to small offerings 
and offerings to a limited number of (new) shareholders. These exemptions apply to most 
offerings with nontradable rights. 
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B. Regulations and tradability 
Regulations in different countries require, enable, or are silent on the tradability of rights. As a 
result, depending on the country, all, some, or none of the issued rights are traded. Following La 
Porta et al. (1998) and Spamann (2010), we interview lawyers, investment bankers, and 
regulators about the existence and regulation of secondary rights markets.
7
 Nontraded rights are 
the norm in only a few countries, most of whom are former communist countries that have seen a 
wave of privatization and in which the government still holds a large stake in public firms.
8
 At 
the other end of the spectrum are many countries in Europe and Asia (and in all of Latin 
America), where issuers are required to make a market for rights. We refer to such countries as 
“mandatory trading” countries. 
In the rest of the world, companies can choose whether or not the rights will be traded. 
We refer to these as “choice” countries. Within most of the Commonwealth, this choice is 
structured and regulated. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and the U.K., offerings without tradable 
rights are called open offers and are subject to a separate set of regulations (Korteweg and 
Renneboog 2002). In Australia and New Zealand, offerings without a secondary rights market are 
                                                          
7
 For general descriptions of regulations on rights offerings, see Myners (2005) for an overview of European 
regulations. See also Balanchandran et al. (2008) for Australia, Fung et al. (2008) for China, Rantapuska and 
Knupfer (2008) for Finland, Gajewski, and Ginglinger (2002) for France, Stehle et al. (2000) for Germany, 
Tsangarakis (1996) for Greece, Ching et al. (2006) for Hong Kong, Marisetty et al. (2008) for India, Bigelli (1998) 
for Italy, Kang and Stulz (1996) for Japan, Salamudin et al. (1999) for Malaysia, Marsden (2000) for New Zealand, 
Bøhren et al. (1997) for Norway, Tan et al. (2002) for Singapore, Dhatt et al. (1996) for South Korea, Pastor-Llorca 
and Martin-Ugedo (2004) for Spain, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) for Sweden, Loderer and Zimmermann (1987) for 
Switzerland, Limpaphayom and Ngamwutikul (2004) for Thailand, Adaoglu (2006) for Turkey, and Armitage (1998) 
for the U.K. and U.S. 
8
 For example, Atanasov et al. (2010) give a detailed description of diluted minority shareholder value due to 
Bulgarian rights offerings before a 2002 reform that required rights to be tradable. As in Bulgaria prior to 2002, 
trading occurs only rarely in Russia and China. 
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called nonrenounceable (Balachandran et al. 2008, 2012). Open and nonrenounceable rights 
offers often have size or discount requirements. In the U.K., for example, open offers are allowed 
unless the discount exceeds 10%. Open offers require only a simplified prospectus (or none at 
all). In contrast, U.S. and Swiss firms are free to choose whether to make their rights tradable. In 
other countries (e.g., Germany, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands), rights are always tradable 
but issuers are not required to provide a market for them. It is typical in these countries for 
issuers to be (at least partially) exempt from prospectus requirements if existing shareholders are 
the only ones subscribing to the new rights. 
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
A. Data 
We use a sample of SEOs obtained from Bloomberg. Our sample starts in 1995 (when data on 
rights trading became available from Bloomberg) and ends in 2008. We exclude offerings of 
preferred stocks, loan stocks, shares in related companies, rights with warrant sweeteners, and 
poison-pill rights. If the offering extends to cross-listed securities, we include only the main 
security. Bloomberg lists rights and cash offers in its corporate action calendar. Most of this 
information is listed on dedicated screens for each transaction that can be accessed from the 
corporate action calendar list. We collect this information by looking up the transaction window 
for each offering. These screens state whether the right is traded and provide trading dates and 
sometimes tickers in addition to event dates, currency, subscription price, number of rights 
issued, and number of rights needed to buy one share. When no ticker is listed, we identify the 
ticker as the related security that was listed and delisted on the dates provided. These tickers are 
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named after country-specific conventions and are usually identifiable as rights (e.g., by a suffix 
“R”). Accounting and market data on the underlying stock are obtained from Datastream. 
Bloomberg lists announcements of 12,639 such rights offerings for which we are able to 
find accounting information from Thomson Datastream. For 8,238 rights offerings, we can 
determine with certainty whether the rights could be traded. We find that only 6,918 (84%) of the 
offerings could be traded. Bloomberg provides rights trading data for most countries. For 3,942 
of the 6,918 offerings, we are able to retrieve trading data. We lose observations because of 
Bloomberg’s policy of storing and reusing security tickers, which varies across countries. For 
example, Bloomberg recycles security tickers for rights in Hong Kong and does not maintain 
records of all their trading histories; hence, we are able to retrieve trading data for only 10% of 
the traded Hong Kong rights offerings. Overall, our sample covers 69 countries and is not 
dominated by the largest markets. 
For stock exchanges that are large and more developed, the number of events per country 
is in line with data reported by the European study of Rinne and Suominen (2008) and also with 
other data sources such as the Securities Data Corporation (SDC). The SDC data includes more 
transaction details than are available from Bloomberg, but only for a select sample of large 
offerings. The coverage of smaller, less developed markets (e.g., Panama, Turkey, Brazil) varies 
across databases. Appendix A compares the number of observations listed in Bloomberg with 
those listed by SDC (ordered by the number of transactions), and for this comparison we also 
obtain announcements of cash offers. Bloomberg lists cash offers as a corporate actions category 
separate from rights offerings; in contrast, SDC simply “flags” rights offerings within its single 
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list of all offerings. As a consequence, mixed offers may appear in each Bloomberg list but only 
once in SDC (sometimes flagged as a rights offer), which may explain the discrepancy between 
the two databases in the fraction of rights offers. On the one hand, SDC generally provides better 
coverage on cash offers. This advantage is consistent with its widespread use in the cash offer 
literature [for an overview, see Eckbo et al. (2007)]. On the other hand, Bloomberg offers a more 
comprehensive coverage of rights offerings in all countries but Japan (58 vs. 70 covered by 
SDC). In total, Bloomberg describes 25,077 rights offerings, compared with 7,919 described by 
SDC, for the period 1995–2008. 
B. Descriptive statistics 
Table I lists our sample countries and the number of rights that were actually traded with 
Datastream data available. For comparison, we also document the number of cash offerings for 
which Datastream data are available. The number of offerings with a secondary rights market 
varies. In the U.S. and in most British Commonwealth countries, a substantial portion of rights is 
not traded. In particular, the fraction of offerings without trading is 56% in the U.S., where 
issuers have a free choice;
9
 8% in the U.K., where such open offers are allowed only if the 
discount does not exceed 10%, and 29% and 68% in Hong Kong and Australia (respectively), 
where neither has a discount limit. In Singapore, where the 10% discount limit does apply, 
companies provide a market for rights in all but 5% of the offerings. In Western Europe, issuers 
in several countries restrict trading in offerings: 38% of offerings in Germany provide no rights 
market; the fraction is 27% in Belgium and 21% in Switzerland. In most Scandinavian, Southern 
                                                          
9
 This figure is similar to the 51% reported by Holderness and Pontiff (2012). 
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European, and Latin American countries, nearly all rights are traded, except for a few small 
offerings that involve controlling shareholders. 
[Insert Table I about here] 
We use the term “choice countries” when referring to the countries that allow the issuer to 
restrict the tradability of the rights. We identify these countries by observing the de facto 
incidence of secondary rights markets. Thus, choice countries are those in which each type 
(tradable and nontradable) accounts for more than 5% of the market. Actual trading incidences 
are important because they reflect a true market choice, rather than merely a rule imposed by 
regulations, which may or may not actually be enforced. We employ a 5% threshold because 
there are exceptional cases where issuers deviate from their regulatory regime; for example, when 
they cater to foreign shareholders or to a controlling shareholder. A 1% threshold yields similar 
results, but it would misclassify certain countries as choice countries when both regulators and 
issuers regard trading as mandatory. It is important to note that a classification based on 
interviews with regulators and lawyers confirms our assessment for almost all countries. The only 
exceptions are Malaysia, where issuers have a choice yet 97% of all rights are traded, and 
Argentina, where we obtain trading data for only 19 cases of which just one (5.3%) involved 
nontradable rights. None of our results changes qualitatively when we employ a 1% threshold. 
In Table II, we compare the characteristics of the offerings with and without rights 
markets. (See Appendix B for a description of all variables.) Panels A and B report statistics for 
choice countries and all countries, respectively. The transaction costs of setting up a rights market 
are likely to be more relevant for small firms. Consistent with this argument, issuers that choose 
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nontradable rights (in choice countries) tend to be smaller, with average assets of $632 million 
versus $2,300 million for offers with rights markets. A similar relationship holds when we 
compare tradable and nontradable offerings in all countries. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
Firms that are more opaque engender a greater dispersion of opinions. Therefore, they 
may want to avoid the additional risk associated with rights trading. Indeed, we find that, in the 
choice countries, issuers with no tradable rights are less liquid [with a mean Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure of 3.62 × 10
-5
 vs. 1.76 × 10
-5
 for issuers with tradable rights]. They also tend 
to be covered by fewer analysts (12 vs. 28). We again see a similar pattern in the baseline sample. 
We can make a similar argument for firms in financial distress: the success of the 
transaction should be more important for such firms, but the distressed state will make it more 
difficult to convince investors to insert new equity capital (e.g., Myers 1977). The univariate 
statistics on financial constraints and recent performance shown in Panel A of Table II are 
ambiguous. On the one hand, issuers with nontradable rights are on average less leveraged than 
are those with tradable rights (31% vs. 48%). On the other hand, there is no significant difference 
between the number of issuers in financial distress as measured by the Altman Z-score (38% in 
both samples), and issuers with nontradable rights have significantly lower interest coverage 
(0.87 vs. 1.58 in the sample with rights trading). Moreover, issuers with nontradable rights are far 
less profitable (ROA of -18% vs. -3%). A significant portion of the offerings occurs after market 
crashes, which is defined as periods during which the stock market falls by more than 10% in the 
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two preceding months, but there is no significant difference for the incidence of offerings with 
tradable and nontradable rights (15% and 17%) in such periods.  
We report the difference between the ROA in the year of the offering and the ROA in 
each of the three following years. Consistent with the argument that firms want to restrict rights 
trading to cover up potentially bad information and induce investors into subscribing to reduce 
the firm’s execution risk, issuers with nontradable rights underperform after the offering. On 
average, their profitability declines by 10% in the first year after the offering and recovers only 
by 2% (1%) in the second (third) year after the offering. This performance is significantly worse 
than for issuers with tradable rights: in the first year after the offering, the ROA of issuers 
offering tradable rights is 6% higher than that of issuers offering nontradable rights, and this 
difference remains fairly stable throughout the subsequent two years. The all-country sample 
(Panel B of Table II) exhibits a similar pattern. 
In rights offerings, blockholders face a trade-off between sustaining their ownership level 
and financing a large part of the offering. We measure block ownership with a dummy variable 
that equals 1 in the presence of a shareholder with ownership greater or equals 25% (block), and 
another variable that indicates the total percentage held in such blocks (% held). Panel A of Table 
II shows that, in the choice countries, tradable rights are associated with more blocks (11% vs. 
8% in nontradable offerings). This contrasts with the argument that blockholders use nontradable 
rights to squeeze out minority shareholders.
10
 Conditional on owning a block of shares, full 
participation in the issuance is more expensive for those who seek to preserve their ownership. 
                                                          
10
 Note that we define an ownership “block” as a share exceeding 25% of all outstanding shares. We also report the 
percentage of shares owned by such blockholders. 
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Consistent with this argument, we find that in the choice countries blocks are significantly larger 
in issues with tradable rights (53% vs. 46%). No such difference is observed in the all-country 
sample, despite its exhibiting a similar percentage of block ownership. 
The paternalistic hypothesis proposes that firms with undervalued shares restrict trading 
to protect their shareholders from selling undervalued rights. This phenomenon should therefore 
be more prevalent in firms with better governance. To measure governance quality, we use the 
“corporate governance quality” index of Aggarwal et al. (2011), which is a composite measure of 
board composition, auditing thoroughness, anti-takeover provisions, compensation policies, and 
ownership quality (governance (AEFM)). Against the paternalistic hypothesis, in Table II we 
document that governance does not explain the difference between issuers of tradable versus 
nontradable rights in either the all-country or the choice-country sample.  
Finally, we document transaction-specific characteristics. Recall that some countries 
allow nontradability only if the offer does not exceed certain size and discount limits. We 
measure the offering size with the number of shares offered as a percentage of shares outstanding 
prior to the offering, and the discount as the offering price relative to the closing stock price five 
days prior to the announcement. In line with such rules, offerings with no trading rights in choice 
countries are smaller (27% vs. 31%) and have smaller discounts (21% vs. 25%). This finding is 
consistent also with the hypothesis that firms use nontradability to minimize execution risk 
without offering a deep discount. Trading takes time: on average, rights are traded over a span of 
13 days in choice countries. Altogether, 21 days pass between the announcement and the 
effective date when rights are traded, which is 9 days more (on average) than for offerings with 
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no trading rights. Nine days can lead to considerably higher execution risk, especially during a 
financial crisis. The Australian Securities Exchange (2010, p. 25) points out that “during times of 
extreme market disturbances the longer timetable for completing a renounceable issue carries the 
potential for exposure of the issuer to greater market risk.” 
Table III provides descriptive statistics of characteristics for countries with different 
trading regimes. Choice countries have a significantly higher gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita, as well as a higher average market-to-book ratio. These differences reflect the prevalence 
of developed countries in this group, which includes most Commonwealth countries and the U.S. 
However, choice and nonchoice countries do not differ in terms of real interest rate, government 
debt, size of the equity market, or inflow of foreign direct investment. This suggests that they are 
also not fundamentally different in terms of their equity markets or investor sophistication. 
[Insert Table III about here] 
Owing to the predominance of British Commonwealth countries in the choice-country 
sample, the legal system of the majority is of English origin. The other choice countries are 
mostly European, and 23% (resp., 15%) of them feature a legal system of French (resp., German) 
origin. Overall, the choice countries are less often governed by civil law (only 24%) than by 
common law. Table III also shows that, as a group, choice countries have better governance than 
countries where trading is mandatory. This difference is significant when governance is measured 
by judicial efficiency and the quality of accounting standards. The implication is that, in countries 
where shareholder rights are promoted, regulators will more likely support the freedom of 
companies to deny rights tradability. Regulators may well believe that there are good reasons, 
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based on maximizing shareholder value (via reduced transaction costs, execution risk, or 
paternalistic policies), for allowing nontradable rights. 
III. The Market for Rights 
Finance textbooks often assume that investors are indifferent between exercising rights and 
selling rights to other investors. Such a stance presupposes that rights are liquid and priced 
correctly. In this section, we address two fundamental questions. First, just how liquid are rights? 
Second, are rights priced close to their intrinsic value?  
A. Liquidity of the rights market 
Panel A of Table IV displays univariate statistics on the liquidity measures for the rights and for 
the underlying stocks. The average sample firm had zero returns (Lesmond et al. 1999; Bekaert et 
al. 2007) for 20% of the rights trading period and a bid-ask spread of 4%, which is in line with 
previous research on the liquidity of international firms (e.g., Lesmond 2005; Lang et al. 2012). 
We also report the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure; following Lesmond (2005), we exclude 
prices that exceed ±50% of the prior day’s price. The mean of this measure is 3.40 × 10-5, a value 
comparable to the estimates of Lesmond (2005). 
[Insert Table IV about here] 
The rights are less liquid than the underlying shares. The mean bid-ask spread of rights is 
28%, or seven times the 4% spread of the underlying stock. Rights are not traded on average 55% 
of all the days listed on the market—that is, on the majority of trading days. These values are two 
times the mean of the underlying stock’s zero-trading days. The mean Amihud illiquidity 
measure is four times that of the stock. 
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B. Mispricing in the rights market 
To compare the quoted and theoretical prices, we follow the methodology of Hietala (1994), 
Poitras (2002), and Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) in counting the days on which the quoted 
price is lower (higher) than the lower PCP bound. Violations of the PCP bound enable positive 
returns from an arbitrage strategy that involves shorting the stock and buying the right.  
Given that short selling is not possible in all countries, we compute an additional, more 
conservative lower bound. We therefore first assume an underlying risk arbitrage strategy of 
buying the right and exercising it only if the share price exceeds the exercise price on the day 
before expiration. Then, we calculate the subsequent returns and count the number of days on 
which they are positive. To obtain an even more conservative estimate, we calculate the returns 
after transaction costs. In other words, these are the returns after compensating the investor for 
the trouble of buying and exercising the right. Following Lesmond (2005), we use data from 
Bloomberg and various exchanges to find the commissions and fees paid. We use the worldwide 
average commission and transaction fee for the countries for which we cannot find (respectively) 
an estimate of commissions or a list of official fees. As a conservative proxy for price impact, we 
use the full bid-ask spread at the close of the trading day. 
Panel B of Table IV reports the statistics for our measures of undervaluation. The mean 
right is cheaper (58%, on average) than the lower bound on 17% of all days (% violated). These 
results are not much affected if we consider bid-ask prices instead of closing prices. Also, our 
estimates are on the low side when compared with single-country studies. For example, in his 
analysis of a 1977-1981 sample of Finnish rights, Hietala (1994) finds that 58% of rights are 
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mispriced. Poitras (2002) documents violations on 91% of all days in a sample of Singaporean 
rights offers for the period 1992–1998. In a more recent Finnish sample for 1995–2002, 
Rantapuska and Knupfer (2008) find that rights are underpriced by 15% on average. These values 
are much higher than the 3% of underpriced days observed for U.S. S&P 500 Index options 
(Ackert and Tian 2001), 1% for the French CAC 40 Index options (Capelle-Blancard and 
Chaudhury 2001), and 2% for the Italian MIB 30 Index options (Brunetti and Torricelli 2007). 
The bound based on a risk arbitrage strategy reduces the proportion of positive-arbitrage 
days to 12%. Even after transaction costs, 5% of trading days allow for positive arbitrage. While 
relative mispricing may indicate that either the stock itself is overvalued or that the rights traders 
have (negative) inside information, these results still suggest that shareholders who prefer not to 
exercise their rights will not be fully compensated for the dilution entailed by selling those rights. 
Overall, these findings document that rights markets are illiquid and often undervalued. 
The question is what the firm does in this context. This leads to the choice of tradability. 
IV. Choice of Tradability 
We now investigate why firms deliberately choose to make rights nontradable. Our three 
hypotheses make distinct predictions. Transaction costs should be more relevant for small firms. 
If such costs are the main motive for nontradability, we should observe it more often with smaller 
firms. Execution risk should be higher for firms that are distressed, underperforming, and/or 
opaque. Hence nontradability should be more prevalent among such firms if it does, in fact, 
reduce execution risk. Finally, if issuers restrict trading because they want to protect shareholders 
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from selling their undervalued rights (paternalistic hypothesis), then restrictions should be more 
common among better-governed firms. 
We estimate the probability of making rights tradable as a Probit function of firm, 
transaction, and country characteristics. Firms do not randomly choose rights offers rather than 
cash offers. We control for this choice by using a Heckman (1979) model, which incorporates 
firm size, market-to-book ratio, ownership, and profitability as the drivers of the choice between 
rights or cash offerings. The variable Preright (Spamann 2010) identifies countries in which 
waiving preemptive rights is only allowed in special cases, e.g., with supermajority rules or 
substantive conditions. Given that this variable is likely to be unrelated to the tradability choice, 
we use it as an identifying restriction for our first stage choice between cash or rights. We control 
for year fixed effects. The regression results are reported in Appendix C.  
Table V shows that issuers with tradable rights are significantly larger. This is consistent 
with the univariate results and supportive of the argument that transaction costs are a key driver 
of trading restrictions. Tradability is also associated with a higher pre-issue stock market 
performance (run-up), higher market-to-book ratios, and liquidity. These results are comparable 
to findings based on the Australian sample of Balachandran et al. (2008, 2013).  
Unlike in the univariate analysis, tradability is not related to leverage. However, 
tradability is associated with larger interest coverage, consistent with the univariate analysis. 
These results support the execution risk hypothesis: larger firms with more liquid stock, better 
performance, and better financial health face less execution risk and so have fewer incentives to 
restrict the trading of rights. Block holdings are not significantly related to the choice of 
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tradability. This contrasts with the argument that firms use trading restrictions to consolidate 
ownership and thus evade the market of corporate control. Offerings with traded rights are larger 
and have greater discounts, in line with the rules on tradability in many countries and also with 
the hypothesis that nontradability allows firms to reduce execution risk with a smaller discount. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
In column 2 of Table V, we replace the country fixed effects with country-specific 
variables related to the legal environment [the anti-director index, accounting standards index, 
and judicial efficiency measure of La Porta et al. (2000)] and market development (GDP/capita, 
the real interest rate, ratios of debt, market capitalization, and foreign direct investment inflows to 
GDP). The legal environment is especially important for corporate governance and thus also for 
the paternalistic hypothesis, which proposes that issuers with nontradable rights are better 
governed. To test this hypothesis more precisely, we include the firm-specific governance index 
developed by Aggarwal et al. (2011).  
In line with the paternalistic hypothesis, nontradability is more common in countries with 
better governance (i.e., a higher anti-director index). However, neither the firm-specific 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) governance index or the measure of accounting quality are significantly 
related to tradability. Block ownership is associated with more nontradable rights, which 
indicates that nontradability is more common in countries where block ownership is more 
prevalent. The negative association between equity market size and tradability is most likely 
driven by the U.S. and the U.K., and this underscores the importance of controlling for economic 
conditions or country fixed effects.  
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Overall, firms that restrict trading differ from firms that allow rights to be traded freely, 
especially with respect to size, performance, and financial health. These findings suggest that 
tradability is not irrelevant, and are generally consistent with the argument that issuers prevent 
trading in order to save transaction costs and reduce execution risk.  
V. Profitability and Performance 
In this section, we document the long-term performance of firms after the transactions. As we 
discussed above, firms with bad prospects will need to improve their capital structure, and for 
them a failed rights issue may be more costly. Such firms may therefore seek to lower execution 
risk by pressuring investors into subscribing to a nontradable rights issue. If this is a predominant 
reason for trading restrictions, then we should observe inferior performance after nontradable 
offerings, in terms both of profitability and of financial market return. In contrast, if issuers 
restrict trading to encourage shareholders to subscribe to undervalued shares (paternalistic 
hypothesis), then we would expect to see higher profitability and long-term returns for 
transactions with nontradable rights.  
A. Determinants of profitability 
In this section, we study the profitability of the issuer after the offering. To account for self-
selection into the trading regime, we use a two-step switching regression model with endogenous 
switching, as described in Li and Prabhala (2007). We use the equation whose results are 
described in column 3 of Table V to model the choice of issuing tradable rights while restricting 
the sample to choice countries only. We model the change from the firm’s last reported ROA 
before the offering to the firm’s ROA in the three years after that offering as follows: 
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                                                                 .           (1a) 
                                                                               (1b) 
Here, we allow the residuals i and i to correlate with the residual of the selection equation. 
Because the error terms are correlated, the conditional expectations of the residuals are nonzero. 
Augmenting equations (1a) and (1b) with generalized residuals from the selection regression, we 
are able to obtain consistent estimators via a straightforward extension of the Heckman (1979) 
procedure (Idson and Feaster 1990). 
For each offering i, our set of explanatory variables includes the logarithm of book assets; 
blockholdership, defined as a dummy equal to 1 if any shareholder held more than 25% of all 
shares and the size of the block holdings; the change in free float from the year-end before the 
effective date to the year-end after that date; and a crisis dummy equal to 1 only if the market 
index drops by more than 10% in the 42 days prior to the offering. We control for a set of firm- 
and transaction-specific characteristics such as the a dummy variable for cross-listed offerings; 
the discount of the offering price to the closing stock price five days prior to the announcement; 
the percentage sold as a fraction of the previous shares outstanding; a dummy variable for rights 
prices that were below the PCP bound; the number of previous rights offers undertaken by the 
same issuer in the sample period; the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX/sales); ROA; 
leverage; and the market-to-book ratio.  
The results are reported in Table VI. Columns 1-3 give the results for different years: the 
dependent variable in column 1 (resp., 2 and 3) is the difference between the ROA in the pre-
offering year and the ROA in the first (second, third) year after the offering. Each column reports 
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first the coefficients and z-statistics for the offerings in which rights could not be traded, next are 
the coefficients and z-statistics for the offerings in which rights could be traded, and finally the 
difference between the two coefficients and the p-value for a Chow test that the two coefficients 
are equal. Column 4 reports the results of an OLS regression, which includes the same 
explanatory variables with the addition of an indicator for traded rights offerings and an inverse 
Mills ratio that controls for selection into a rights offering. 
[Insert Table VI about here] 
Issuers perform better after offerings with tradable rights, as indicated by the significantly 
higher intercepts for such issuers. This effect persists throughout the three years following 
issuance and is evident also in the OLS specification (column 4 in Table VI). The differences are 
economically large: 23% for the first year, 55% for the second, and 83% for the third. These 
values seem large, but are not unreasonable considering that the mean ROA is -3.5% for all 
issuers, -0.9% for issuers of traded rights, and -17.0% for issuers of nontraded rights (Table II). A 
closer look at the coefficients reveals that ROA improves significantly (by an average 9 
percentage points) after issues with tradable rights, whereas ROAs either decline or stay at about 
the same level after issuances with no tradability. This effect is also evident in the OLS 
regression (column 4), in which the coefficient on traded rights is associated with statistically 
significant one-year changes in ROA of 4%. Such a positive relation between profitability and 
tradability is consistent with the argument that issuers with bad prospects restrict trading to 
reduce execution risk. However, it does not support the paternalistic hypothesis that issuers 
restrict trading when they believe the firm will perform better in the future. 
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Large firms perform better after offerings without rights trading; conversely, small firms 
perform better after offerings with rights trading. This suggests that even though small firms 
generally prefer nontradability because of concerns about transactions costs, they trade those off 
with execution risk concerns.  
The presence of blockholders does not matter for the relationship between tradability and 
performance. The coefficients for the blockholder dummy and the size of the block ownership are 
not significantly different between tradable and nontradable offerings. The only significant 
coefficient for the blockholder dummy is positive (for nontradable offerings) in the third year 
after the offering; however, the difference with respect to tradable offerings is not significant. 
The results are similar for the change in free float, although here the only significant coefficient 
(also positive and for nontradable offerings) is in year two, not three. As with the blockholder 
dummy, the difference between nontradable and tradable offerings is not significant. 
Issuers may restrict tradability to reduce execution risk in markets that are doing poorly 
for reasons unrelated to company-specific events. In this case, nontrading may be less a sign of 
future bad prospects and more a sign of paternalistic behavior: if managers believe that markets 
are overreacting, then pressuring investors to buy the new shares is a sensible course of action. In 
line with this argument, the coefficient for the crisis dummy is significantly negative for firms 
that issue tradable rights, in contrast to the general premise that trading is a signal of good 
economic prospects. The coefficient for nontradable rights is not significant in the first two years 
after the offering but significantly positive in the third year. 
Overall, performance patterns after the offering indicate that the decision on tradability 
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reveals information about the issuer’s prospects. Issuers with worse future performance tend to 
restrict trading, which is consistent with the execution risk hypothesis. However, this pattern is 
reversed if offerings coincide with markets in crisis: recovery appears smoother after crisis 
offerings with trading restrictions. The fact that ownership concentration is not related to the 
profitability gap between tradable and nontradable offerings suggests that abuse of minority 
shareholders (e.g., Baek et al. 2006; Atanasov et al. 2010) is not a factor in our sample. 
B. Determinants of announcement returns 
Do the markets reward tradability? To answer this question, we examine market reaction in this 
section. We define the reaction to the event announcement as the residual of a market model run 
through the 250 trading days ending 42 days before the announcement. We use the respective 
regional MSCI index as a proxy for the market index. We cumulate abnormal returns over the 
windows (-1,1), and (5,5), where (x,y) denotes a window ranging from day x through day y 
relative to the announcement date. We use Datastream-adjusted returns for this exercise. Because 
Espenlaub et al. (2009) point out that Datastream does not always adjust correctly for ex rights 
and effective dates, we do not cumulate returns over longer windows and follow their 
recommendation to focus on the (-1,1) and (-5,5) returns.  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table VII. The market reacts positively to rights 
offerings in general; on average, 1.83% over the (-1,1) window, and over the (-5,5) window, 
cumulative abnormal returns amount to 3.89%. These results are in contrast with those of 
numerous studies that have reported negative excess returns to cash offerings (see Eckbo, 
Masulis, and Norli, 2007 for a survey). One interpretation of this finding is that cash offers are 
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made when firms issue overvalued stock to new investors. Given that rights offers involve shares 
being offered to existing shareholders, such timing considerations should be irrelevant. 
[Insert Table VII about here] 
The positive returns to rights offer announcements are driven mainly by offers that allow 
rights to be traded. When focusing on choice countries, we find that average abnormal returns to 
offers with tradable rights are significantly positive: 1.48% for the (-1,1) window and 3.67% for 
the (-5,5) window. But if the rights are not traded, then the announcement returns are negative 
over both windows and significantly so for the (-5,5) window. The difference in abnormal returns 
between offers with and without tradable rights is also significantly positive: on average, 2.00% 
over the (-1,1) window. 
Are the positive returns to tradable offerings due to the information conveyed by the 
choice to restrict rights trading or rather to the negative response of investors to a lack of trading? 
To address this question, we compare returns on offerings made in countries where issuers have 
no choice about tradability to the returns in countries in which issuers are free to decide. Table 
VII shows that announcement returns in countries where trading is mandatory are much smaller 
than in countries where trading results from managerial choice: on average, abnormal returns in 
the former are not significantly different from zero for the (-1,1) window and 1.1% for the (-5,5) 
window. These excess returns are significantly smaller than in the choice countries. This means 
that the choice of having rights traded and not being subject to a coercive offer without trading is 
appreciated by investors, and suggests that this choice may convey additional information. 
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In Panel B of Table VII, we report a comparison of our results on rights offerings with the 
extant (single-country) literature. The announcement returns are qualitatively comparable to those 
reported in most of the literature, despite differences in sample periods. The only notable 
discrepancy concerns Japan, a country with extremely few rights offers (52 in our sample) and 
for which Kang and Stulz (1996) report positive announcement returns, whereas we report 
negative announcement returns. 
Next, we regress the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) on transaction and firm 
characteristics. If a corporate event is voluntary and investors are rational, then the stock price 
reaction should incorporate their interpretation of the firm’s selected issuance type (Eckbo et al. 
1990). We therefore use a switching regression similar to the one described in Section V to 
account for self-selection into the respective trading regimes: 
                                                                .       (2a) 
                                                                            (2b) 
As in the last section, we allow the residuals i and i of the abnormal returns in equations (2a) 
and (2b) to correlate with the residuals of the selection equation. The control variables of 
Transaction and firm characteristics are the same as those described previously with respect to 
equations (1a) and (1b). The only difference is that here we exclude the variables that are not 
known at the time of the announcement: change in free float, future CAPEX/sales, leverage, and 
market-to-book. Instead, we add the run-up to the offering and the interest coverage ratio of the 
issuer in order to measure the effect of contemporaneous valuation and distress effects. For 
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offerings with rights trading, we again control for large discrepancies in rights and underlying 
prices with a dummy variable for rights prices that were below the PCP bound. 
The results for these regressions are reported in Panel C of Table VII. Columns 1-2 report 
the results for different return windows: column 1 for the three days between the day before the 
announcement and ending on the day after (-1,1), and column 2 for the 11 days starting five days 
before the announcement and ending five days afterwards (-5,5). As in Table VI, each column 
reports first the results for the offerings in which rights could not be traded, then those for 
offerings in which rights could be traded, and finally the p-value for a Chow test that the two 
coefficients are equal; column 3 reports the results of an OLS regression. We see that the market 
reacts positively to offerings in which rights can be traded, as indicated by their significantly 
higher intercepts. Controlling for selection and for firm and transaction characteristics, the 
difference between the residual announcement returns of issuers with and without tradable rights 
amounts to 21% for the (-1,1) window and 31% for the (-5,5) window. These findings hold also 
when we use an OLS framework that includes a dummy variable (Trading) for traded rights 
(column 3): the coefficient for the tradability indicator is a significant 2%, which is similar to the 
magnitudes found via the univariate analysis (Panel A). The positive reaction to rights tradability 
is in line with the observed subsequent better performance. However, it is not consistent with the 
argument that undervalued issuers restrict trading: the market, at least, seems not to view 
nontradable rights as a positive signal. A closer look at the coefficients reveals that the returns to 
offerings with no rights trading are still positive (albeit not significant for the (-1,1) window). It is 
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therefore unlikely that the difference between tradable and nontradable rights is driven by price 
pressure from investors selling their shares before the record date to avoid possible dilution. 
Smaller firms do not experience higher returns when the rights are not tradable. That is, 
we find no evidence for the hypothesis that transaction costs drive restrictions on rights trading. 
Neither are the coefficients for ownership significantly different between traded and nontraded 
rights: apparently, investors do not interpret blockholder consent to nontradable rights as 
predicting either better or worse future performance. 
The reported coefficients differ significantly during adverse market conditions. In crisis 
markets, the reaction to offerings without a rights market are significantly better than the reaction 
to offerings with a rights market; 2.3% for the (-1,1) window (significant at the 10% level) and 
6.6% for the (-5,5) window (significant at the 5% level). This difference is driven mainly by the 
negative coefficients for offerings with tradable rights. The market reaction to those issuances 
indicates that in times of crisis, the absence of rights trading increases shareholder wealth. 
The control variables show that issuers with cross-listed securities and greater discounts 
earn lower returns on traded rights offerings. Note that the market reaction to discounts is 
generally negative, consistent with the premise underlying the execution risk hypothesis: using a 
deep discount to enhance the prospects of a traded rights issue sends a negative signal. Firms 
with a greater number of past rights offer experience; less profitable firms and firms with better 
interest coverage exhibit better announcement returns without rights trading, but significantly so 
only for the (-1,1) window. Other coefficients are not significantly different, including the one for 
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rights prices below the put-call parity bound. The signs in the OLS regression (column 3) are 
almost always the same as in the switching regressions but the magnitudes are usually smaller. 
In sum, we confirm the findings in Panel A of Table VII that announcement returns are 
higher for offerings with tradable rights. This disproves the hypothesis that shareholders are 
impartial to the tradability of rights beyond their implied transaction cost savings. Instead, the 
result is consistent with the observed subsequent development in profitability and therefore 
indicates that markets correctly interpret trading restrictions as a negative signal. 
The market, however, does not always react negatively to restrictions on rights trading. 
For instance, the generally positive returns to voluntary trading are reversed after market crashes. 
This positive effect of nontradability in unstable markets suggests that issuers restrict trading to 
protect investors from selling undervalued rights in the middle of a financial crisis. Also, 
although transaction costs may increase the reluctance of small firms to issue rights that are 
tradable, size alone does not explain the market’s response to trading restrictions. 
C. Long-term returns 
If the market is not efficient, then the impact of tradability on shareholder value will not be 
confined to short-term announcement returns. We therefore study monthly abnormal returns in 
the two years starting from the month after the effective date.
11
  
We plot the simple average cumulated monthly returns (in excess of the regional MSCI 
index) for choice countries in Figure 2. These returns are inconsistent with the paternalistic 
                                                          
11
 We impose the one-month embargo to avoid any systematic Datastream mistakes in adjusting for the rights and 
new shares, as documented by Espenlaub et al. (2009) for UK open (i.e., nontradable) offers. 
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hypothesis: rights issues are followed by negative rather than positive excess returns. The returns 
of issuers of nontradable rights and those of tradable rights are similar: no group performs 
consistently better than the other. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
However, simply subtracting the market index ignores the differences in other factors. 
Hence, we use a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression model to forecast returns as a function of 
tradability. We control for the same variables described in Section V; we also add the 
contemporaneous return on assets, interest coverage, size of the issuer (in the year that returns are 
assessed), as well as the market index returns and the SMB (small minus big), HML (high minus 
low), and momentum factors from Ken French’s website. We use global factors in our base 
specification and test for whether local factors make a difference (following Fama and French 
2012). We estimate a cross-sectional regression for each month and then calculate the time series 
average of the coefficients; we report t-statistics using the time series standard error of the mean. 
As before, we restrict the analysis to choice countries. 
The results are reported in Table VIII. There is no significant difference in long-term 
returns between issuers that choose to make their rights tradable and those that do not, a finding 
that is inconsistent with the paternalistic hypothesis. The negative announcement returns for 
nontradable issues is not reversed in the long run; the long-term stock price performance is 
consistent both with investors’ beliefs at announcement and with the observed development in 
profitability. The coefficient is equally insignificant when we augment the return window from 
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12 to 18 (column 2) and 24 months (column 3) or when we use local Fama-French factors instead 
of the global ones (column 4). 
[Insert Table VIII about here] 
There are only few other variables that explain returns. Returns are lower after offerings 
with deeper discounts, although only at the 5% level of significance when we use local factors 
and higher after larger offerings. When rights prices violate the PCP bounds, 18-month returns 
are lower (significant at the 10% level). Larger firms perform better in the first 12 months 
(significant at the 10% level). Firms with past rights offers perform better in 24-month returns. 
Returns are higher after offerings during a financial crisis, but not significantly so unless we use 
local Fama-French factors. 
To see how offering and firm characteristics affect returns after offerings with traded 
versus nontraded rights, we split the sample and repeat the analysis for the subsample of offerings 
without (column 5) and with (column 6) rights trading. None of the coefficients are significantly 
different from its counterpart. Whether the offering coincided with low market returns or was 
issued in the presence of block owners is not significantly related to returns in any specification. 
To test for robustness, we also repeat our analysis of long-term returns with the “calendar 
time” portfolio return methodology advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
Thus, we form equal- and value-weighted portfolios for each month. These portfolios include all 
companies that have completed an offering within the prior 24 months (or 12 and 6 months, 
respectively). Portfolios are rebalanced monthly by dropping all companies that reach the end of 
the holding period and adding companies that have just executed an offering. The monthly 
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portfolio excess returns are then regressed on the MSCI World Index returns in excess of the one-
month U.S. T-bill rate, and the intercept is reported as the average monthly abnormal return. 
Table IX shows the results. We first report the portfolio returns as intercepts measured 
against the MSCI World Index (Panel A). The returns for offerings are negative irrespective of 
rights trading, but they are significantly negative only for the traded rights sample over a period 
of two years. None of the differences between traded and nontraded rights offerings are 
statistically significant for equal-weighted or for value-weighted returns. We find no evidence for 
superior or inferior performance after issuance with or without rights trading. Note that the 
returns are not positive for any of the offering samples and that they are negative both for the 
mandatory countries and for the traded choice-country sample. These results indicate that rights 
offerings are not made only by undervalued firms. 
[Insert Table IX about here] 
We compute the same return differentials for subsamples. Most of the subsample results 
are either comparable to the base sample results or not significant. The only exception is that 
issuers with rights prices trading below the PCP bound have significantly negative equally-
weighted returns in a two-year period; this result is consistent with our Fama-MacBeth analysis. 
Hence, it may be less accurate to say that the rights were undervalued than that the underlying 
shares were overvalued. 
We provide two final robustness checks. First, we regress the portfolio returns against the 
Fama and French (1998) global factors, SMB, HML, and momentum; the results, which are 
virtually unchanged from the baseline results, are reported in Panel B of Table IX. The negative 
 39 
coefficients for the individual returns of the portfolios with trading (voluntary), not trading 
(voluntary), and trading (mandatory) corresponds with gains in statistical significance, but there 
are no such gains with respect to differences in portfolio returns. In fact, the two-year return 
difference between voluntary and mandatory trading offers becomes insignificant while the other 
differences remain nearly unchanged. Second, we follow Eckbo et al. (2000) and create a 
benchmark by matching each issuer with a similar firm that did not undertake an SEO in the 
same year; the results are reported in Panel C. Once again, return differences are not significant. 
Overall, issuers do not perform better after offerings with nontradable rights. This result 
contradicts the paternalistic hypothesis that issuers make rights nontradable to protect 
shareholders from selling undervalued shares or rights that are due to recover in the future. 
VI. Conclusion 
Textbook descriptions of rights offerings often assume that shareholders who do not want to 
exercise their rights can sell them instead. However, this assumption does not always hold. In 
some countries, rights cannot be traded at all; in many other countries, the issuer itself decides 
whether or not rights will be tradable. Even though rights markets are often illiquid, investors 
appreciate rights tradability and react better to offerings of firms that make their rights tradable. 
This raises the question of why a firm would restrict the tradability of rights. 
We consider three hypotheses. First, tradability involves transaction costs for the issuing 
firm. Such fixed offering costs should matter more to small firms, and we do find that small firms 
are more likely than large ones to issue rights that are not tradable. Yet nontradability does not 
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have a positive effect on the returns of smaller firms, which indicates that other reasons may also 
be important. 
Second, we argue that tradable rights increase the risk of insufficient demand for the new 
shares. Concerns related to execution risk should be more important for firms with less attractive 
future prospects, firms for which information has a greater effect on share price, and during 
periods of market crisis. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that unprofitable and opaque 
firms, as well as firms in markets whose returns have fallen by 10% or more in the month prior to 
the offering, are less likely to make their rights tradable. Subsequent to nontradable rights 
offerings, issuers experience declines in profitability, as well as negative short-term and long-
term excess returns. These performance patterns are reversed when the offering coincides with a 
general market crisis, in which case issuers actually experience higher announcement returns 
when they restrict rights trading. A likely explanation for this reversal is that, in such markets, a 
prohibition against rights trading is perceived as a strategy to prevent shareholders from selling 
undervalued rights. Indeed, regulators (e.g., Australian Securities Exchange 2010) explain that 
they allow so-called fast-track offerings with nontradable rights in order to enable offerings 
during financial crises. 
Our third hypothesis is that managers resort to issuing rights (rather than cash) offers, and 
then restrict the trading of those rights, to prevent dilution of current shareholder value if the 
stock is undervalued. This paternalistic hypothesis implies that the firms choosing to restrict 
tradability should be characterized by better governance and also that restricting tradability 
should lead to higher subsequent firm performance. However, we find no evidence to support 
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either of these contentions. Although tradability is negatively related to the anti-director index, 
firm-specific governance matters little for the choice of tradability. Announcement returns are 
lower for offers in which rights are not traded, and that performance is not reversed; to the 
contrary, firms with nontradable rights perform worse in the two years after the offering in terms 
of both profitability and stock returns. 
Unlike previous, country-specific evidence, our results do not suggest that issuers 
systematically squeeze out minority shareholders. Neither performance measure is systematically 
(negatively) related to the presence of controlling shareholders. This finding implies also that 
tradability is not an indicator of inside information held by controlling shareholders about the 
firm’s prospects. 
Regulations on rights offerings vary widely across countries. Few regulators (e.g., in the 
U.K.) allow and set out conditions for trading restrictions and also require issuers to reimburse 
shareholders that do not exercise their rights. Our results suggest that such regulations might 
improve shareholder value. We hope that future research in specific markets will lead to 
improvements in regulations on rights offerings. Another interesting research avenue would be to 
explore the interactions between rights offerings and other regulations (e.g., bankruptcy regimes). 
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Appendix A: Bloomberg versus SDC 
This table reports the number of cash offers and rights offers listed in the Bloomberg and SDC databases, in order of 
the country’s SEO frequency. 
 
Country    Bloomberg   SDC 
(underlying)   Cash Rights   Cash Rights 
       US 
 
10,894 549 
 
15,375 304 
UK 
 
4,835 1,558 
 
5,637 509 
Australia 
 
4,368 2,384 
 
12,579 2,018 
China 
 
1,328 2,120 
 
581 69 
Japan 
 
2,250 58 
 
3,709 70 
Hong Kong 
 
1,962 913 
 
2,549 463 
South Korea 
 
1,387 2,490 
 
2,358 655 
Canada 
 
4,794 368 
 
15,522 58 
Germany 
 
446 1,191 
 
679 226 
Taiwan 
 
806 1,266 
 
491 220 
France 
 
334 545 
 
781 226 
Malaysia 
 
266 580 
 
462 351 
Sweden 
 
173 631 
 
378 236 
Singapore 
 
456 302 
 
671 205 
Brazil 
 
214 998 
 
412 13 
Greece 
 
174 427 
 
173 39 
Turkey 
 
35 715 
 
58 9 
Italy 
 
145 301 
 
363 119 
South Africa 
 
183 506 
 
183 27 
Thailand 
 
100 1,099 
 
303 187 
Norway 
 
232 250 
 
365 61 
Indonesia 
 
87 293 
 
117 193 
Switzerland 
 
154 259 
 
283 67 
India 
 
498 644 
 
526 193 
Spain 
 
129 174 
 
310 62 
Poland 
 
131 188 
 
144 19 
Chile 
 
47 280 
 
86 276 
Mexico 
 
57 391 
 
171 18 
Austria 
 
75 184 
 
105 50 
Netherlands 
 
225 40 
 
478 31 
Denmark 
 
94 117 
 
187 67 
New Zealand 
 
141 160 
 
227 70 
Ireland 
 
235 65 
 
237 16 
Portugal 
 
35 124 
 
109 57 
Philippines 
 
63 159 
 
180 80 
Belgium 
 
77 90 
 
167 26 
Pakistan 
 
0 310 
 
29 0 
Finland 
 
77 46 
 
211 34 
Bermuda 
 
167 26 
 
207 1 
Israel 
 
145 156 
 
199 9 
Peru 
 
4 206 
 
35 2 
Egypt 
 
13 133 
 
72 35 
Argentina 
 
18 113 
 
47 82 
Kuwait 
 
5 109 
 
12 12 
Sri Lanka 
 
3 127 
 
2 4 
Russia 
 
113 24 
 
139 16 
Jordan 
 
1 121 
 
13 10 
UAE 
 
13 47 
 
13 1 
Qatar 
 
2 30 
 
4 12 
Oman 
 
1 44 
 
4 5 
Others  617 1,166  1,140 406 
Total   38,609 25,077   69,083 7,919 
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Appendix B: Definitions of variables 
Variable Definition 
  Country/Market 
 
Accounting LLSV (1998) estimate of accounting standards (where 90 represents a high level of transparency) 
Anti-director 
LLSV (1998) estimate of shareholder protection, ranging from 0 to 6 (where 6 represents a high 
level of protection) 
Average Q Countrywide average market-to-book ratio 
Choice One if trading of preemptive rights is not mandatory and 0 otherwise 
Crisis One if runup index ≤ -10% (0 otherwise) 
Debt/GDP Ratio of government debt to GDP 
FDI inflow/GDP Rtaio of net foreign direct investment inflow to GDP 
GDP/capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current US 
dollars. 
Governance (GMI) GMI country governance index 
HML High-minus-low factor from Ken French's website 
Index returns Log return on the regional MSCI index 
Judicial efficiency 
LLSV (1998) estimate of the efficieny of the judicial system, ranging from 0 to 10 (where 10 
represents a high level of efficiency) 
Legal origin LLSV (1998) legal origin 
Market/GDP Ratio of equity market size to GDP 
Prevote 
Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if preemptive rights can be waived by a simple majority vote (0 
otherwise) 
Preright Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if waiver is subject to special conditions (0 otherwise) 
Preexpl 
Spamann (2010) estimate: 1 if the law makes special mention of shareholders' first opportunity to 
buy shares (0 otherwise) 
Real interest Real interest rate 
Run-up index Return on the local MSCI index from 42 days to 1 day before the announcement 
MB Small-minus-big factor from Ken French's website 
UMD Momentum factor from Ken French's website 
  Liquidity 
 Amihud Amihud (2002) measure with data corrections according to Lesmond (2005) 
Bid–ask Bid–ask spread divided by the average of bid and ask 
Rights below PCP One if #violated > 0 (0 otherwise) 
%violated Percentage of trading days on which the last price was below the put–call parity bound 
#violated Number of trading days on which the last price was below the put–call parity bound 
Underpriced by One minus the ratio of price to put–call parity bound if price is below the bound (0 otherwise) 
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Zero return days Fraction of days with zero return to total days traded 
  Transaction 
 
Change in free float 
Changes in free float from the last year-end before announcement to the year-end after the 
effective date 
Cross-listed One if the offering was registered for securities listed in more than one country (0 otherwise) 
Days announcement to  
effective Number of days between announcement and effective dates 
Discount Discount to the closing price five days prior to the announcement 
% sold Percentage of new shares sold as a fraction of shares outstanding prior to the offering 
Trading One if a market for rights existed (0 otherwise) 
Trading days (actual) Number of trading dates with positive volume 
  Firm 
 # Analysts Number of analysts covering the firm (on I/B/E/S) 
Assets Total assets (thousands of US dollars) 
Block >25% One if >25% of shares are held by a single blockholder, 2011 data from Orbit 
CAPEX/sales Capital expenditures/sales 
Distress One if Z < 1.8 and 0 otherwise 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes (thousands of US dollars) 
Employees Number of employees (000) 
Forecast STD Standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
Free float Ratio of Datastream free float market value to Datastream market value 
Governance (AEFM) Governance index of Aggarwal et al. (2011) 
% held (>25%) Sum of percentage of shares held in blocks > 25% 
Interest coverage EBIT/interest expenses 
Leverage Net market leverage 
Market cap Price multiplied by shares outstanding (thousands of US dollars) 
Market-to-book Market to book ratio 
Past rights offers Number of rights offers previously announced by the same issuer in the sample period 
ROA EBIT/assets 
Run–up Returns 6 months to 42 days before the announcement 
Sales Sales (thousands of US dollars) 
Z Altman Z-score 
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Appendix C: Rights versus cash offers 
This table shows the results of a Probit regression in which the dependent indicator variable is set equal to 1 if the 
offering includes preemptive rights (and to 0 otherwise). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
(respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Dependent variable= rights  
          
     Firm Log assets 
 
-0.089*** 
 
   
(-22.215) 
 
 
Market-to-book 
 
-0.167*** 
 
   
(-16.87) 
 
 
Block >25% 
 
0.006*** 
 
   
(3.973) 
 
 
% held (>25%) 
 
-0.181** 
 
   
(-2.071) 
 
 
ROA 
 
0.026 
 
   
(0.532) 
 
 
Preright 
 
0.200*** 
 
   
(27.833) 
 Constant 
  
0.919*** 
 
   
(15.507) 
 Fixed effects Year 
 
Yes 
 
     
     N 
  
              24,579  
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Table I. Sample data by country 
This table gives a breakdown of the sample by country of incorporation (50 largest in terms of number of offerings) 
listed by the number of offerings. “Choice countries” are those in which > 5% and < 95% of rights are traded. 
Country (underlying) Total 
 
Offering 
 
Rights 
 
Choice  
country 
   
Cash Rights 
 
not traded traded 
 
          US 4648 
 
4316 332 
 
56% 44% 
 
x 
UK 2935 
 
1581 1354 
 
8% 92% 
 
x 
Australia 2685 
 
1413 1272 
 
68% 32% 
 
x 
China 1819 
 
442 1377 
 
N/A N/A 
  Japan 1555 
 
1503 52 
 
0% 100% 
  Hong Kong 1318 
 
902 416 
 
29% 71% 
 
x 
South Korea 1232 
 
353 879 
 
0% 100% 
  Canada 1206 
 
1085 121 
 
1% 99% 
  Germany 1077 
 
187 890 
 
38% 62% 
 
x 
Taiwan 762 
 
318 444 
 
0% 100% 
  France 560 
 
177 383 
 
5% 95% 
 
x 
Malaysia 491 
 
85 406 
 
3% 97% 
  Sweden 470 
 
83 387 
 
0% 100% 
  Singapore 460 
 
222 238 
 
5% 95% 
 
x 
Brazil 435 
 
64 371 
 
0% 100% 
  Greece 378 
 
75 303 
 
0% 100% 
  Turkey 348 
 
20 328 
 
0% 100% 
  Italy 298 
 
79 219 
 
1% 99% 
  South Africa 267 
 
58 209 
 
0% 100% 
  Thailand 257 
 
37 220 
 
0% 100% 
  Norway 251 
 
82 169 
 
5% 95% 
 
x 
Indonesia 247 
 
39 208 
 
1% 99% 
  Switzerland 236 
 
70 166 
 
21% 79% 
 
x 
India 231 
 
117 114 
 
1% 99% 
  Spain 196 
 
64 132 
 
0% 100% 
  Poland 171 
 
50 121 
 
0% 100% 
  Chile 170 
 
13 157 
 
0% 100% 
  Mexico 164 
 
22 142 
 
0% 100% 
  Austria 161 
 
42 119 
 
19% 81% 
 
x 
Netherlands 160 
 
127 33 
 
20% 80% 
 
x 
Denmark 156 
 
43 113 
 
0% 100% 
  New Zealand 131 
 
33 98 
 
12% 88% 
 
x 
Ireland 127 
 
73 54 
 
9% 91% 
 
x 
Portugal 105 
 
23 82 
 
0% 100% 
  Philippines 104 
 
25 79 
 
0% 100% 
  Belgium 89 
 
34 55 
 
27% 73% 
 
x 
Pakistan 86 
 
1 85 
 
0% 100% 
  Finland 81 
 
46 35 
 
4% 96% 
  Bermuda 79 
 
73 6 
 
20% 80% 
 
x 
Israel 75 
 
39 36 
 
0% 100% 
  Peru 63 
 
1 62 
 
0% 100% 
  Egypt 60 
 
4 56 
 
0% 100% 
  Argentina 57 
 
2 55 
 
5% 95% 
 
x 
Kuwait 57 
 
2 55 
 
N/A N/A 
  Sri Lanka 40 
 
0 40 
 
0% 100% 
  Russia 39 
 
15 24 
 
N/A N/A 
  Jordan 35 
 
0 35 
 
0% 100% 
  UAE 25 
 
2 23 
 
0% 100% 
  Qatar 24 
 
0 24 
 
0% 100% 
  Oman 23 
 
0 23 
 
0% 100% 
  Others 101 
 
64 37 
 
6% 94% 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A provides statistics for choice countries (listed in Table I) and Panel B for all countries. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
t-stat
mean median mean median of difference
General firm characteristics Assets 2,300,922     157,211     631,823           12,272            (6.40)              ***
Market cap 395,970       74,612       143,874           11,501            (8.35)              ***
Market-to-book 1.45            1.10          1.77                1.53                7.09                ***
EBIT 67,593         4,390         19,813            (552)               (7.06)              ***
Sales 843,187       69,505       237,455           3,324              (7.89)              ***
Employees 2,826           439           1,019              53                  (8.34)              ***
Liquidity/information asym. Amihud 1.76E-05 7.67E-07 3.62E-05 9.03E-06 11.17              ***
# Analysts 28.10          2.00          12.16              0 (6.92)              ***
Financial constraints Leverage 47.7% 40.9% 31.1% 16.6% (9.74)              ***
Z 4.30            2.16          7.59                2.74                8.99                ***
Distress 38.3% 0.0% 37.5% 0.0% (0.18)              
Interest coverage 1.58            0.70          0.87                0.34                (3.23)              ***
Recent performance ROA -3.4% 2.9% -17.8% -7.0% (16.27)             ***
Run-up index 6.2% 8.5% 5.0% 8.6% (1.53)              
Crisis 15.3% 0.0% 16.6% 0.0% 1.45                
Post-offering performance Change in ROA (year 1) -4.1% -0.3% -10.3% -0.3% (4.14)              ***
Change in ROA (year 2) -3.4% -0.1% -8.3% 0.9% (2.85)              ***
Change in ROA (year 3) -2.0% 0.3% -6.9% 0.7% (2.78)              ***
Ownership and governance Block >25% 10.9% 0.0% 7.9% 0.0% (2.65)              ***
% held (>25%) 52.85          50.15         45.69              45.27              (3.05)              ***
Governance (AEFM) 47.0% 46.3% 46.3% 46.3% (1.12)              
Transaction characteristics % sold 31% 27% 27% 21% (8.23)              ***
Discount 25% 21% 21% 15% (3.99)              ***
Days announcement to effective 21.16          13 12.26              5 (8.93)              ***
Trading days (actual) 12.86          10
N 1,2492,045
Panel A. Choice countries
Rights trading Rights not trading
t-stat
mean median mean median mean median of difference
General firm characteristics Assets 4,741,630        204,121           5,487,145     318,985     835,016           14,079            (14.28)             ***
Market cap 340,707           50,585            374,074       64,860       165,858           12,718            (8.21)              ***
Market-to-book 1.33                1.03                1.25            1.00          1.75                1.50                15.57              ***
EBIT 166,895           5,195              194,181       8,621         25,945            (508)               (13.34)             ***
Sales 1,892,035        108,233           2,192,965     164,471     314,500           4,361              (14.93)             ***
Employees 2,603              467                 2,833           602           1,236              66                  (8.55)              ***
Liquidity/information asym. Amihud 1.83E-05 6.14E-07 1.49E-05 3.65E-07 3.51E-05 7.60E-06 16.29              ***
# Analysts 21.04              0 22.57          1.00          13.04              0 (4.74)              ***
Financial constraints Leverage 52.1% 41.7% 56.0% 47.7% 31.9% 16.8% (15.47)             ***
Z 3.73                1.74                2.89            1.65          7.33                2.63                19.71              ***
Distress 51.4% 1.00                54.5% 1.00          38.5% 0.0% (8.62)              ***
Interest coverage 0.90                0.18                0.91            0.17          0.84                0.27                (0.64)              
Recent performance ROA -3.5% 2.8% -0.9% 3.5% -17.0% -5.9% (26.13)             ***
Run-up index 6.1% 8.4% 6.4% 8.4% 4.8% 8.6% (2.48)              **
Crisis 17.9% 0.0% 18.1% 0.0% 16.4% 0.0% (0.16)              
Post-offering performance Change in ROA (year 1) -4.3% -0.3% -3.3% -0.3% -9.6% -0.2% (6.45)              ***
Change in ROA (year 2) -3.9% -0.2% -3.0% -0.2% -8.3% 0.7% (4.71)              ***
Change in ROA (year 3) -2.6% 0.0% -1.8% -0.1% -6.5% 0.6% (4.22)              ***
Ownership and governance Block >25% 8.8% 0.0% 9.1% 0.0% 7.6% 0.0% (1.58)              
% held (>25%) 50.91              49.29              51.66          50.00         46.38              45.54              (2.45)              **
Governance (AEFM) 44.7% 43.9% 44.4% 43.9% 45.9% 46.3% (0.07)              
Transaction characteristics % sold 32% 26% 34% 29% 25% 19% (15.54)             ***
Discount 24% 21% 25% 23% 23% 18% (2.29)              **
Days announcement to effective 19.08              11 20.50          13 11.92              5 (10.20)             ***
Trading days (actual) 14.24          12
N 12,639 6,918 1,320
Panel B. All countries
All rights offerings Rights trading Rights not trading
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Table III. Country characteristics 
This table shows univariate statistics for countries under different rights trading regimes. Listed are the means for 
mandatory trading versus choice countries and the results of tests for differences between them (i.e., 24% of 
countries with mandatory regime have legal systems of English origin, and those countries have an average 
GDP/capita of USD17,509). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. 
 
 
Mandatory Choice
Economic GDP/capita 17,509                 49,264                 (4.89)                   ***
Real interest 2.32                    3.23                    (0.44)                   
Debt/GDP 51.41                  52.29                  (0.07)                   
Market/GDP 39.62                  99.86                  (2.85)                   
FDI Inflow/GDP 7.17                    8.17                    (0.28)                   
Average Q 1.98                    4.17                    (2.58)                   **
Legal origin English 24% 54% (2.11)                   **
French 52% 23% 1.88                    *
German 20% 15% 0.34                    
Nordic 4% 8% (0.48)                   
Civil 76% 46% 2.11                    **
Regulation of pre- Preright 2.40                    2.25                    0.97                    
emptive rights Prevote 2.53                    2.58                    (0.38)                   
Preexpl 2.33                    2.50                    (0.41)                   
Governance Anti-director 3.57                    4.40                    (1.40)                   
Judicial efficiency 8.18                    10.00                  (2.12)                   **
Accounting 63.45                  71.80                  (2.28)                   **
Governance (GMI) 4.42                    5.95                    (1.09)                   
Trading
t-stat of difference
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Table IV. Liquidity and mispricing characteristics 
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum of rights liquidity and of the underlying 
stock (Panel A) in addition to underpricing characteristics (Panel B). 
 
Mean SD Min Max
Panel A: Liquidity measures
Right
Bid-ask 28% 34% 3% 152%
Zero return days 55% 32% 0 97%
Amihud 1.53E-04 6.11E-04 0.00E+00 4.40E-03
Underlying
Bid-ask 4% 6% 0% 0%
Zero return days 20% 16% 0% 99%
Amihud 3.40E-05 7.80E-05 0.00E+00 3.12E-04
% violated
Close 17% 34% 0 100%
Ask 12% 29% 0 100%
Bid 15% 31% 0 100%
If violated, underpriced by
Close 58% 34% 9% 99%
Ask 60% 33% 10% 99%
Bid 55% 34% 6% 99%
% risk arbitrage possible (no short sales)
No transaction costs 12% 31% 0% 100%
Transaction costs 5% 20% 0% 100%
Panel B: Underpricing
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Table V. Choice of offering type 
This table shows the results of Probit regressions in which the dependent indicator variable is set equal to 1 only if 
the rights are traded (choice-country sample); the inverse Mills ratio (for selection into a rights offering) is estimated 
with the regression reported in Appendix C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Firm Log assets 0.726* 0.548*** 0.295***
(1.915) (8.168) (17.391)
Market-to-book 1.216* 0.840*** 0.335***
(1.729) (6.897) (9.545)
Block >25% -0.04 -0.025*** -0.001
(-1.466) (-2.999) (-0.209)
% held (>25%) 1.042 0.644* 0
(1.324) (1.673) (0)
ROA 0.259 0.697*** 0.697***
(1.345) (5.57) (5.57)
Amihud -1783.181**
(-2.02)
# Analysts 0
(-0.228)
Forecast STD -0.003
(-0.426)
Run–up 0.088***
(3.079)
Leverage -0.017
(-0.198)
Interest coverage 0.096***
(2.886)
Crisis -0.180**
(-2.126)
Transaction % sold 0.750***
(4.585)
Discount 0.435**
(2.388)
Governance Anti-director -0.807***
(-2.702)
Accounting 0.027
(0.452)
Governance (AEFM) -0.078
(-0.021)
Country Log GDP/capita -0.342**
(-2.115)
Real interest 0.031
(1.161)
Debt/GDP 0.013
(1.21)
Market/GDP -0.004***
(-2.807)
FDI inflow/GDP 0.009
(0.706)
Heckman Mills -33.699 -22.745*** -7.335***
(-1.576) (-6.792) (-10.719)
Constant 7.82 14.090*** 0.218
(1.257) (3.213) (0.789)
Fixed effects Country Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Availability of interest Yes
Availability of Gov. Yes
N 2,045               1,357               2,820               
Dependent variable = trading
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Table VI. Subsequent performance 
This table shows the results of switching regressions (columns 1-3) and an OLS regression (column 4) in which the 
dependent variable is the growth in ROA from the year prior to the announcement to the first (second, third) year 
after the effective date. In the switching regressions (columns 1-3), the regime (trading versus not trading) is 
estimated with the regression reported in column 3 of Table V. For these regressions, the table reports coefficients 
with z-statistics underneath and the p-value for equality between the coefficients in the two regimes. Column 3 
reports coefficients and t-statistics of OLS regressions; the inverse Mills ratio (for selection into a rights offering) is 
estimated with the regression reported in Appendix C.*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model OLS
Dependent variable Change in ROA Change in ROA Change in ROA Change in ROA
Window Year 1 post minus pre offering Year 2 post minus pre offering Year 1 post minus previous
Trading No Yes
Difference 
(p-value) No Yes
Difference 
(p-value) No Yes
Difference 
(p-value) Both
Constant -0.149 0.091*** -0.231*** -0.131 0.418*** -0.548*** -0.370*** 0.461*** -0.831*** 0.005
(-1.175) (6.32) (0.0037) (-1.128) (6.618) (0.0005) (-2.928) (6.2) (0) (0.068)
Trading 0.044**
(2.477)
Log assets 0.043*** -0.016*** 0.053*** 0.042*** -0.022*** 0.062*** 0.035*** -0.020*** 0.055*** 0.037***
(4.669) (-3.985) (0) (4.739) (-5.145) (0) (4.01) (-4.092) (0) (7.857)
Block > 25% 0.093 0.002 0.091 -0.045 0.052 -0.097 0.218** 0.066 0.152 0.145***
(0.763) (0.039) (0.5838) (-0.356) (0.833) (0.5755) (2.335) (1.001) (0.1447) (2.649)
% held (25%) -0.002 0 -0.002 0 0 0 -0.003* 0 -0.003 -0.002***
(-0.874) (0.011) (0.5171) (0.116) (-0.194) (0.8782) (-1.904) (-0.435) (0.1106) (-2.753)
Change in free float 0.006 0 0.006 0.003** 0.001 0.002 0.003 0 0.003 0.005***
(0.664) (0.126) (0.513) (2.221) (0.962) (0.5644) (0.848) (0.803) (0.4876) (3.535)
Crisis -0.02 -0.034** 0.014 -0.007 -0.030** 0.023 0.090** -0.018 0.1*** -0.069***
(-1.18) (-2.327) (0.5194) (-0.445) (-2.398) (0.2852) (2.425) (-1.3) (0.0063) (-3.026)
Cross-listed -0.006 -0.01 0.004 -0.019 -0.01 -0.009 -0.058 -0.017 -0.041 -0.049***
(-0.421) (-0.97) (0.8332) (-1.104) (-0.883) (0.6689) (-1.591) (-1.328) (0.2882) (-3.482)
Discount 0.043 -0.055** 0.098 0.039 -0.067*** 0.106* -0.184* -0.038 -0.146 -0.103**
(0.697) (-2.146) (0.1467) (0.677) (-2.606) (0.0977) (-1.785) (-1.298) (0.1719) (-2.288)
% sold -0.03 -0.009 -0.021 -0.038 -0.035 -0.003 -0.092 -0.03 -0.062 -0.053
(-0.937) (-0.352) (0.6223) (-1.001) (-1.322) (0.941) (-1.038) (-1.025) (0.5038) (-1.443)
Rights below PCP -0.01 -0.027 -0.012 -0.063*
(-0.507) (-1.597) (-0.467) (-1.746)
Past rights offers 0.006 0 0.006 0.003 0.007 -0.004 -0.023 0.002 -0.025* -0.004
(1.09) (0.126) (0.4018) (0.608) (1.414) (0.6524) (-1.624) (0.581) (0.0867) (-0.768)
ROA (pre offering) -0.514*** -0.833*** 0.319** -0.515*** -0.879*** 0.364** -0.889*** -0.880*** -0.009 -0.470***
(-4.667) (-14.13) (0.0478) (-5.217) (-15.464) (0.0139) (-10.797) (-12.915) (0.9291) (-7.87)
CAPEX/Sales -0.036* -0.047*** 0.011 0.001 -0.045** 0.046 -0.134** -0.058*** -0.076 -0.02
(-1.83) (-4.208) (0.6154) (0.023) (-2.561) (0.2497) (-2.221) (-3.447) (0.2267) (-0.878)
Leverage 0.02 0.034*** -0.014 0.037** 0.037*** 0 0.015 0.016 -0.001 0.049***
(1.094) (2.903) (0.5221) (2.115) (2.863) (0.982) (0.426) (1.265) (0.9754) (2.971)
Market-to-book 0.041 -0.037*** 0.078** 0.037 -0.037*** 0.074** -0.059*** -0.052*** -0.007 -0.01
(1.601) (-2.883) (0.0323) (1.578) (-2.712) (0.0345) (-2.714) (-3.353) (0.7864) (-0.827)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mills -0.954***
(-5.595)
N 2,176 2,069 1,945 2,176
Switching regressions Switching regressions Switching regressions
Year 3 post minus pre offering
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Table VII. Announcement returns 
Panel A shows the average cumulative abnormal announcement returns in windows of (-1,1) and (-5,5) days around 
the announcement. Panel B presents the averages from regressions reported by the works cited compared to average 
announcement returns in the respective countries in our sample. Panel C displays the results of regressions in which 
the dependent variable is the cumulative announcement returns during both the (-1,1) and the (-5,5) window of days 
around announcement. In the switching regressions (columns 1-2), the regime (trading versus not trading) is 
estimated with the regression reported in column 3 of Table V. For these regressions, the table reports coefficients 
with z-statistics underneath and the p-value for equality between the coefficients in the two regimes. Column 3 
reports coefficients and t-statistics of OLS regressions; the inverse Mills ratio (for selection into a rights offering) is 
estimated with the regression reported in Appendix C. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 
Panel A: Univariate comparison of announcement returns
(1) (2)
Announcement return window (-1,1) (-5,5)
All right offers 1.83% *** 3.89% ***
Trading (choice country) 1.48% *** 3.67% ***
Not trading (choice country) -0.52% -1.20% ***
Trading (mandatory trading country) -0.01% 1.03% **
Trading minus Not trading (choice country) 2.00% *** 4.86% ***
t -stat (3.96) (4.86)
Choice trading minus Mandatory trading 1.50% *** 2.64% ***
t -stat (4.2) (3.61)
Panel B: Comparison with existing studies of rights offer announcement returns
Literature Bloomberg sample (1995-2008)
Country Study N Sample period AR N AR (-5,5)
US Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 53 (uninsured) 1963-81 -0.59% 332 -0.8% ***
128 (standby) -0.70%***
Hansen (1988) 102 1964-86 -2.4%***
Singh (1997) 63 1963-85 -1.07%***
Heron and Lie (2004) 56 1980-98 -1.1%
UK Slovin, Sushka, and Lai (2000) 200 (standby) 1986-94 -2.9%*** 1354 -5.2% ***
20 (uninsured) -4.96%***
Australia Balachandran et al (2008) 636 1995-2005 -1.74%*** 1272 -0.6%
Japan Kang and Stulz (1996) 28 1985-91 2.21%*** 52 -0.9% ***
Hong Kong Wu and Wang (2006) 180 1989-97 -3.37%*** 416 -9.0% ***
Korea Kang (1990) 89 1984-88 0.95% 879 4.9% ***
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Panel C: Determinants of announcement returns
(1) (2) (3)
Model OLS
Window (-1,1) (-5,5) (-1,1)
Trading No Yes
Difference 
('p-value) No Yes
Difference 
('p-value) Both
Constant 0.038 0.245*** -0.207*** 0.159*** 0.472*** -0.313*** 0.197***
(1.28) (11) (0) (3.527) (9.435) (0) (7.294)
Trading 0.022***
(4.055)
Log assets -0.007 -0.012*** 0.005 -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.009 -0.005***
(-0.972) (-7.241) (0.5546) (-6.568) (-6.358) (0.1303) (-3.578)
Block > 25% 0.067 0.017 0.05 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.031
(1.54) (0.678) (0.2991) (0.089) (0.098) (0.9832) (1.403)
% held (25%) -0.001 -0.001** 0 0 -0.001 0.001 -0.001***
(-1.634) (-2.309) (0.625) (0.118) (-1.356) (0.3979) (-2.961)
Crisis -0.01 -0.033*** 0.023* -0.024 -0.090*** 0.066*** -0.023***
(-1.067) (-3.81) (0.0635) (-1.61) (-5.449) (0.0035) (-3.578)
Cross-listed 0.005 -0.018*** 0.023** 0.009 -0.050*** 0.059*** -0.014***
(0.616) (-2.875) (0.0215) (0.731) (-3.93) (0.0011) (-2.679)
Discount -0.029 -0.146*** 0.117*** -0.093** -0.340*** 0.247*** -0.112***
(-1.21) (-9.024) (0.0001) (-2.549) (-10.812) (0) (-8.96)
% sold 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.012 0.028 -0.04 -0.01
(1.049) (-0.628) (0.2285) (-0.394) (0.881) (0.365) (-0.871)
Past rights offers -0.001 -0.007*** 0.006* -0.006 -0.013*** 0.007 -0.005***
(-0.597) (-4.568) (0.0546) (-1.628) (-4.712) (0.1844) (-3.239)
Rights below PCP 0.032 0.032 0.014
(1.531) (0.762) (1.123)
ROA -0.026 0.032 -0.058** -0.01 0.032 -0.042 0.014
(-1.188) (1.531) (0.0495) (-0.284) (0.762) (0.4085) (1.123)
Run–up 0.006* 0.009*** -0.003 0.007 0.016*** -0.009 0.007***
(1.825) (2.923) (0.4875) (1.3) (2.689) (0.2528) (3.447)
Interest coverage 0.001** 0 0.001** 0.001 0 0.001 0
(2.27) (-0.377) (0.0214) (0.515) (-0.528) (0.5536) (0.037)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mills -0.204***
(-3.608)
N 2,214          2,214          2,214
Switching regressions Switching regressions
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Table VIII. Fama–MacBeth regressions 
This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions in which the dependent variable is the average monthly 
return in the 12, 18, or 24 months beginning one month after the effective date. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at (respectively) the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All Not trading Trading
Period (months) 12 18 24 12 12 12
Fama-French factors Global Global Global Local Global Global
Trading -0.006 0.088 0.13 0.005
                                   (-0.321) (1.124) (1.047) (0.82)
Right below PCP 0.003 -0.015* -0.005 0.005 0.037
(0.273) (-1.693) (-1.123) (0.611) (0.602)
Discount -0.041* -0.039 -0.031 -0.045** -0.028* -0.18
                                   (-1.7) (-1.283) (-0.938) (-1.995) (-1.73) (-1.055)
% sold 0.014** 0.014** 0.016** 0.01 0.008 -0.035
                                   (2.121) (2.223) (1.987) (1.624) (0.312) (-0.805)
Cross-listed -0.003 -0.018 -0.032 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011*
(-0.563) (-1.108) (-1.325) (-0.993) (-0.279) (-1.877)
ROA 0.02 0.053 0.062 0.01 0.017 0.099
(1.372) (1.616) (1.204) (0.556) (1.217) (1.05)
Log assets 0.005* 0.004 0.004 0 0.004 0
                                   (1.688) (1.248) (1.166) (0.132) (1.087) (-0.039)
Interest coverage 0 -0.002 -0.002 0 0.004 0.016
                                   (0.304) (-1.484) (-1.601) (-0.362) (1.11) (1.118)
Past rights offers -0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.001 0.008 -0.005
                                   (-0.177) (1.171) (2.006) (0.445) (0.947) (-1.142)
Change in Free float -0.006 0.003 0.01 -0.005 -0.013 -0.032
                                   (-1.042) (0.272) (0.857) (-0.885) (-1.203) (-1.277)
Crisis 0.005 0.015 0.019 0.013** 0.02 0
                                   (1.011) (1.558) (1.271) (2.054) (1.574) (0.072)
Block > 25% -0.015 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 -0.03 -0.009
(-0.97) (-0.242) (-0.968) (-0.672) (-0.562) (-0.44)
% held (25%) 0 0 -0.001 0 0 0.002
                                   (1.346) (-0.543) (-0.806) (0.721) (0.27) (1.129)
Index returns -0.027 -0.089 -0.075 0.034 -0.205** 0.041
                                   (-0.52) (-1.35) (-1.263) (0.188) (-1.994) (0.178)
SMB 0.001 0.008 0.01 -0.194 0.006 -0.002
                                   (0.276) (1.071) (0.898) (-1.208) (1.289) (-0.526)
HML -0.003 0.021 0.031 -0.11 -0.006 -0.004
                                   (-0.557) (1.126) (1.044) (-1.122) (-0.737) (-0.516)
UMD 0 0.001 0.003 -0.195 0.003 0.014
(-0.197) (0.27) (0.505) (-1.293) (0.672) (0.914)
Constant                           -0.067 -0.02 0.05 0.015 -0.078 0.046
                                   (-1.369) (-0.238) (0.402) (0.504) (-1.377) (0.472)
Country F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N                                  26,752              41,412              56,120              25,900              11,525              15,227              
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Table IX. Calendar-time portfolio returns 
Panels A and B report abnormal returns based on calendar-time portfolio regressions as described by Fama (1998). 
Excess returns are regressed against the MSCI World Index in Panel A and against the global Fama-French factors in 
Panel B; abnormal performance is measured by the intercept of this time-series regression. Panel C reports estimates 
for portfolios that short matching nonissuing firms. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at (respectively) the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
Return window (0,6) (0,12) (0,24) (0,6) (0,12) (0,24)
Trading (choice country) -0.002 -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.005 -0.011**
(-0.68) (-1.124) (-1.719) (-0.357) (-1.051) (-1.998)
Not trading (choice country) -0.008 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0
(-1.347) (-1.08) (-1.216) (-0.102) (-0.514) (-0.071)
Trading (mandatory) -0.013*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(-4.533) (-3.562) (-3.9) (-0.699) (-0.825) (-0.708)
Trading minus Not trading 0.006 0.002 0 0 -0.001 -0.011
(choice country) (1.025) (0.431) (0.003) (-0.012) (-0.162) (-1.567)
Rights below minus above PCP 0.002 -0.004 -0.012** 0 0.003 0.001
(choice country) (0.263) (-0.71) (-2.408) (-0.044) (0.327) (0.079)
Block > 25% only: 0.01 0.004 0 0.003 0.003 0.002
Trading minus Not trading (choice country) (0.606) (0.335) (0.005) (0.158) (0.24) (0.173)
Crisis only: 0.008 0.005 -0.003 0.028 0.027 0.021*
Trading minus Not trading (choice country) (0.579) (0.54) (-0.505) (1.245) (1.505) (1.792)
Trading (choice country) -0.006** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.012**
(-2.131) (-2.866) (-3.759) (-0.762) (-1.175) (-2.179)
Not trading (choice country) -0.014** -0.011** -0.009*** -0.008 -0.012 -0.007
(-2.124) (-2.537) (-2.85) (-0.885) (-1.403) (-1.021)
Trading minus Not trading 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.005
(choice country) (1.157) (1.016) (0.633) (0.4) (0.614) (-0.888)
Trading (choice country) 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(1.284) (-0.31) (-1.111) (0.55) (-0.995) (-1.126)
Not trading (choice country) -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 0.001
(-0.541) (-0.345) (-0.19) (-0.181) (-0.379) (0.128)
Trading minus Not trading 0.007 0.001 -0.002 0.01 -0.003 -0.008
(voluntary) (1.017) (0.151) (-0.733) (0.679) (-0.269) (-0.86)
equally weighted value-weighted
Panel B: Calendar-time portfolio returns with global Fama-French factors
Panel C: Calendar-time portfolio returns against matched firms (and index)
Panel A: Calendar-time portfolio returns against the index
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Figure 1. Seasoned equity offerings over time 
Source: Securities Data Corporation. 
 
 
Figure 2. Long-term returns in excess of regional MSCI index: Trading versus not trading (choice 
countries only) 
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